TY  - BOOK
AU  - Dailami,Mansoor
AU  - Hauswald,Robert
ED  - Banco Mundial
TI  - Risk shifting and long-term contracts: evidence from the Ras Gas Project 
T2  - Policy research working paper
U1  - 354.428519 21
PY  - 2000///
CY  - Washington, D.C.
PB  - World Bank. Development Research Group
KW  - SERVICIOS PUBLICOS
KW  - FINANCIAMIENTO DE PROYECTOS
KW  - RIESGO FINANCIERO
KW  - CONTRATOS
KW  - MODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
KW  - CONTAMINACION DEL MEDIO FISICO
KW  - POLUCION
KW  - EFECTOS EXTERNOS
KW  - CONTRATACION
N1  - Bibliografía: p. 21-23
N2  - Risk shifting and incomplete contracting
 lie at the heart of the agency relationship inherent in the
 procurement and financing of large-scale projects such as
 power plants, oil and gas pipelines, and liquefied natural
 gas (LNG) facilities. Resolving this agency problem is
 critical in structuring the nexus of long-term
 contracts--construction, operating, output sale, and
 financial contracts--commensurate with the project's
 underlying tehcnological and market organization. By
 investigating the Ras Gas bonds--the largest and most liquid
 global project bonds ever issued in an emerging market
 economy--the authors provide empirical evidence of the
 risk-shifting consequences of contractual incompleteness.
 They relate the credit spreads of Ras Gas bonds to the bond
 spreads of the Korea Electric Power Company (Kepco), the
 major customer, in the context of a 25-year supply
 agreement, the oil price index used to price the LNG,
 emerging debt market returns, and various systematic and
 unsystematic risk variables. Consistent with theoretical
 predictions, they find that the risk factors affecting the
 sales and purchase agreements drive perceptions of market
 risk for Ras Gas bonds. In particular, Ras Gas yield spreads
 reflect the market's risk assessment of Kepco. Other
 priced risks are energy price and foreign currency exposure
 (which influence Ras Gas credit spreads through their impact
 on Kepco), Korean economic variables, and spillovers from
 turbulence in European and Latin American emerging debt
 markets. The authors' analysis shows that the design of
 each contractual arrangement is not independent, because
 risk factors relevant to one contract determine the price
 and risk premium of the other. Despite heavy capitalization
 and partial guarantees by the parent companies of Ras Gas,
 the off-take agreement essentially determines the riskiness
 of the bonds. The authors interpret this as evidence of the
 nexus-of-contracts view of the firm in the presence of
 contractual incompleteness: Investors bear all residual
 risks and price their financial claims accordingly
UR  - https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/19764/multi_page.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
UR  - http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PAKISTANEXTN/Resources/GDF-2004/CV-MANSOORDAILAMI.pdf
UR  - http://www1.american.edu/academic.depts/ksb/finance_realestate/rhauswald/
ER  -