BIBLIOTECA MANUEL BELGRANO - Facultad de Ciencias Económicas - UNC

On the stability of collusive price leadership

D'Aspremont, Claude Jacquemin, Alexis Gabszewicz, Jean Jaskold Weymark, John A

On the stability of collusive price leadership - Canadian Economics Association Toronto February 1983 - pp. 17-25 il. - The Canadian Journal of Economics n. 1 00084085 .

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The gains from cartel formation and the stability of a dominant cartel are investigated for the price-leadership model. We show that there is a general interest in the establishment of a cartel with the competitive fringe reaping a disproportionate share of the benefits. In contrast to results involving a continuum of firms, with a finite number of firms (each with the same cost curve) there is always a stable dominant cartel.


H 26710 n. 1, 1983

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