On the stability of collusive price leadership
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TextoSeries The Canadian Journal of Economics ; n. 1Detalles de publicación: Canadian Economics Association ; Toronto ; February 1983 Descripción: pp. 17-25 ilTema(s): ASOCIACION DE PRODUCTORES | CARTELES | PRECIOS FIJOSClasificación CDD: H 26710 n. 1, 1983 Resumen: The gains from cartel formation and the stability of a dominant cartel are investigated for the price-leadership model. We show that there is a general interest in the establishment of a cartel with the competitive fringe reaping a disproportionate share of the benefits. In contrast to results involving a continuum of firms, with a finite number of firms (each with the same cost curve) there is always a stable dominant cartel.
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The gains from cartel formation and the stability of a dominant cartel are investigated for the price-leadership model. We show that there is a general interest in the establishment of a cartel with the competitive fringe reaping a disproportionate share of the benefits. In contrast to results involving a continuum of firms, with a finite number of firms (each with the same cost curve) there is always a stable dominant cartel.
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