Two-part tariff competition in duopoly / Xiangkang Yin.
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Tipo de ítem | Biblioteca actual | Signatura | URL | Estado | Fecha de vencimiento | Código de barras |
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Biblioteca Manuel Belgrano | F 338.523 Y 19744 F (Navegar estantería(Abre debajo)) | Enlace al recurso | Disponible | 19744 F |
Bibliografía: p. 28-30.
Built on the location model, this paper studies the rivalry of two firms in an industry through two-part tariffs. It is found that kinky profit functions are responsible for the coincidence of imperfectly competitive equilibrium and cartelization outcome. A duopoly likely results in higher entry fees and industry profits and lower net consumers surplus than a monopoly because each duopolist has a smaller market size than the monopolist. But social welfare in the monopoly is lower than in the duopoly. In comparison with uniform pricing, two-part tariffs tend to have lower prices, more profits and welfare but the magnitude of net consumers surplus is ambiguous.
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