Intrellectual property rights and international R&D competition / prepared by Stefania Scandizzo.
Tipo de material: TextoSeries IMF working paper ; no. WP/01/81Detalles de publicación: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2001Descripción: 24 pTema(s): Clasificación CDD:- 21 352.749
Tipo de ítem | Biblioteca actual | Signatura topográfica | Estado | Fecha de vencimiento | Código de barras | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Documento | Biblioteca Manuel Belgrano | F 352.749 S 20815 (Navegar estantería(Abre debajo)) | Disponible | 20815 F |
Bibliografía: p. 23-24.
This paper examines a country's incentives for intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in a global trading environment. There is a time inconsistency problem intrinsic to IPR protection: ex ante strong protection is warranted to promote innovation, but once discovery takes place there is an incentive to lower protection. The sub optimal but time consistent policy involves an insufficient level of protection and, therefore, of innovation. In more technologically advanced economies reputational considerations may be sufficient to maintain strong protection. Otherwise a commitment mechanism, such as participation in the World Trade Organization, or, more controversially, some form of bilateral punishment, may be used.
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