Bibliografía: p. 385-388.

Preface -- Pte.1. Rational decision making: 1. The single-person decision problem -- 2. Introducing uncertainty and time -- Pte.2. Static games of complete information: 3. Preliminaries -- 4. Rationality and common knowledge -- 5. Pinning down beliefs: Nash equilibrium -- 6. Mixed strategies -- Pte.3. Dynamic games of complete information: 7. Preliminaries -- 8. Credibility and sequencial rationality -- 9. Multistage games -- 10. Repeated games -- 11. Strategic bargaining -- Pte.4. Static games of incomplete information: 12. Bayesian games -- 13. Auctions and competitive bidding -- 14. Mechanism design -- Pte.5. Dtnamic games of incomplete information: 15. Sequential rationality with incomplete information -- 16. Signaling games -- 17. Building a reputation -- 18. Information transmission and Cheap Talk -- 19. Mathematical appendix -- References.

This comprehensive textbook introduces readers to the principal ideas and applications of game theory, in a style that combines rigor with accessibility. Steven Tadelis begins with a concise description of rational decision making, and goes on to discuss strategic and extensive form games with complete information, Bayesian games, and extensive form games with imperfect information. He covers a host of topics, including multistage and repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, rent-seeking games, mechanism design, signaling games, reputation building, and information transmission games. Unlike other books on game theory, this one begins with the idea of rationality and explores its implications for multiperson decision problems through concepts like dominated strategies and rationalizability. Only then does it present the subject of Nash equilibrium and its derivatives.