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Endogenous games and mechanisms : side payments among players / Matthew O. Jackson, Simon Wilkie.
Tipo de material:
TextoSeries Serie seminarios ; no. 21 / 2001Detalles de publicación: Buenos Aires : Instituto y Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, 2001 Descripción: 42 pTema(s): TEORIA DE LOS JUEGOS | ESTUDIOS DE CASOS | APLICACIONES | CASOS PRACTICOSClasificación CDD: 330.015195 Recursos en línea: Haga clic para acceso en línea Resumen: We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding oÆers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to effcient outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The characterizations are illustrated in a series of examples, including voluntary contribution public good games, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, principal-agent problems, and commons games, among others.
| Tipo de ítem | Biblioteca actual | Signatura | Estado | Fecha de vencimiento | Código de barras |
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Documento
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Biblioteca Manuel Belgrano | F 330.015195 J 19877 (Navegar estantería(Abre debajo)) | Disponible | 19877 F |
Bibliografia: p.33-36.
We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding oÆers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to effcient outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The characterizations are illustrated in a series of examples, including voluntary contribution public good games, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, principal-agent problems, and commons games, among others.
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