Who is afraid of politica risk? : multinational firms and their choice of caital structure / Iris Kesternich, Monika Schnitzer.
Tipo de material:
TextoSeries Discussion paper (Deutsche Bundesbank). Series 1: economic studies ; no. 02/2009Detalles de publicación: Frankfurt am Main : Deutsche Bundesbank, 2009Descripción: 49 pISBN: - 9783865584854
- 21 338.881
| Tipo de ítem | Biblioteca actual | Signatura topográfica | Estado | Fecha de vencimiento | Código de barras | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Documento
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Biblioteca Manuel Belgrano | F 338.881 K 14421 (Navegar estantería(Abre debajo)) | Disponible | 14421 F |
Bibliografía: p. 33-36.
This paper investigates how multinational firms choose their capital structure in response to political risk. We focus on two choice variables, the leverage and the ownership structure of the foreign affiliate, and we distinguish different types of political risk, like expropriation, corruption and confiscatory taxation, and In our theoretical analysis we find that as political risk increases the ownership share always decreases whereas leverage can both increase or decrease, depending on the type of political risk. Using the Microdatabase Direct Investment of the Deutsche Bundesbank, we find supportive evidence for these different effects.
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