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Party alignment, political budget cycles and vote within a federal country / Pablo Garofalo, Daniel Lema y Jorge M. Streb.

Por: Garofalo, Pablo J, 1965-.
Colaborador(es): Lema, Daniel | Streb, Jorge M. (Jorge Miguel).
Tipo de material: TextoTextoSeries Serie documentos de trabajo (Universidad del CEMA): n. 601Editor: Buenos Aires : Universidad del CEMA, 2016Descripción: 45 p.Tema(s): TRANSFERENCIAS ENTRE ADMINISTRACIONES | DEFICIT PRESUPUESTARIO | POLITICA FISCAL | PROVINCIAS | ARGENTINA | POLITICA TRIBUTARIARecursos en línea: Haga clic para acceso en línea Resumen: To understand how intergovernmental relations affect political budget cycles (PBCs) within federal countries, we model the credibility problems of discretionary fiscal policy in combination with a national incumbent that favors aligned districts. Analyzing Argentina’s provinces during the 1985–2001 period, unsurprisingly, provincial budget balances worsen in electoral years, and aligned provinces (where the governor belongs to the president’s party) receive larger federal transfers and have larger public expenditures during the governor’s entire term. The main interaction effect in electoral years is that provincial budget balances only deteriorate in unaligned provinces, which receive less federal transfers. Furthermore, average federal transfers boost the vote for aligned governors. Two broad implications are that studies of subnational PBCs are biased by an omitted factor (discretional federal transfers), and that governors unaffiliated with the president suffer a “Cinderella” effect at the polls which helps the president dominate national politics.
Tipo de ítem Ubicación actual Signatura Estado Fecha de vencimiento Código de barras
Informe técnico Informe técnico Biblioteca Manuel Belgrano
CRAI
88757 n. 601, 2016 (Navegar estantería) Disponible 88757 n. 601, 2016

Bibliografía: p. 34-37.

To understand how intergovernmental relations affect political budget cycles (PBCs) within federal countries, we model the credibility problems of discretionary fiscal policy in combination with a national incumbent that favors aligned districts. Analyzing Argentina’s provinces during the 1985–2001 period, unsurprisingly, provincial budget balances worsen in electoral years, and aligned provinces (where the governor belongs to the president’s party) receive larger federal transfers and have larger public expenditures during the governor’s entire term. The main interaction effect in electoral years is that provincial budget balances only deteriorate in unaligned provinces, which receive less federal transfers. Furthermore, average federal transfers boost the vote for aligned governors. Two broad implications are that studies of subnational PBCs are biased by an omitted factor (discretional federal transfers), and that governors unaffiliated with the president suffer a “Cinderella” effect at the polls which helps the president dominate national politics.

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