TY  - BOOK
AU  - Laster, David
AU  - Bennett, Paul
AU  - Geoum, In Sun
ED  - Federal Reserve Bank of New York
TI  - Rational bias in macroeconomic forecasts
T2  - Staff reports
U1  - 338.5442 21
PY  - 1997///
CY  - New York, N.Y.
PB  - Federal Reserve Bank of New York
KW  - PREDICCIONES ECONOMICAS
KW  - EXPECTATIVAS RACIONALES
KW  - MODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
KW  - PRONOSTICOS ECONOMICOS
N1  - Incluye bibliografía
N2  - This paper develops a model of macroeconomic forecasting in which the wages firms pay their forecasters are a function of their accuracy as well as the publicity they generate for their employers by being correct. In the resulting Nash equilibrium, forecasters with identical models, information, and incentives nevertheless produce a variety of predictions in order to maximize their expected wages. In the case of heterogeneous incentives, the forecasters whose wages are most closely tied to publicity, as opposed to accuracy, produce the forecasts that deviate most from the consensus. We find empirical support for our model using a twenty-year panel of real GNP/GDP forecast data from the survey Blue Chip Economic Indicators. Although the consensus outperforms virtually every forecaster, many forecasters choose to deviate from it substantially and regularly. Moreover, the extent of this deviation varies by industry in a manner consistent with our model
UR  - https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=993826
ER  -