Moral hazard : does IMF financing encourage imprudence by borrowers and lenders? / Timothy Lane, Steven Phillips.
Tipo de material:![Texto](/opac-tmpl/lib/famfamfam/BK.png)
- 1589060881
- 21 332.152
Contenidos:
Understanding moral hazard -- Are creditors confident the IMF will save them? -- Does the news reveal moral hazard? -- Does the scale of IMF lending create serious moral hazard? -- Conclusions.
Tipo de ítem | Biblioteca actual | Signatura topográfica | Estado | Fecha de vencimiento | Código de barras | |
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Biblioteca Manuel Belgrano | F 332.152 L 20838 (Navegar estantería(Abre debajo)) | Disponible | 20838 F |
"This Economic Issue is based on IMF Working Paper WP/00/168, 'Does IMF financing result in moral hazard?', October 2000".
Understanding moral hazard -- Are creditors confident the IMF will save them? -- Does the news reveal moral hazard? -- Does the scale of IMF lending create serious moral hazard? -- Conclusions.
Donación Banco Central de la República Argentina
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