Heterogeneous dynasties and the political economy of public debt / G. de Walque and L. Gevers.
Tipo de material: TextoSeries Working papers. Research series (The University of Namur. Facultés Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix)Detalles de publicación: Namur : The University of Namur. Faculté des Sciences Economiques, Sociales et de Gestion, 2001Descripción: 54 pTema(s): Clasificación CDD:- 21 339.470151
Tipo de ítem | Biblioteca actual | Signatura topográfica | Estado | Fecha de vencimiento | Código de barras | |
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Documento | Biblioteca Manuel Belgrano | F-D 339.470151 W 19832 (Navegar estantería(Abre debajo)) | Disponible | 19832 F |
We consider a small open overlapping generations economy with descending altruism. Heterogeneity is introduced by assuming that each parent procreates a fixed proportion of selfish children. Altruistic parents can recognize the type of each child. There is no Ricardian equivalence and an active public intergenerational transfer policy is attractive to altruistic dynasty members, although there may be no unanimity among them. We display reasonable conditions for indirect preferences to be single-peaked and we apply the median voter theorem. We then describe political equilibrium paths and discuss their compatibility with the steady path of an underlying closed economy with autonomous labor productivity growth.
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