000			02447nam a2200277 a 4500
003			arcduce
005			20120731113349.0
008			100211s1991 dcu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aarcduce
082			_a336.3435
090			_c16710 _d16710
100			_aCohen, Daniel
245			_aDebt, debt relief, and growth : _ba bargaining approach _c/ Daniel Cohen, Thierry Verdier
260			_bWorld Bank _aWashington, D.C. _c1991
300			_a27 p. : _bil.
490			_aPolicy, research, and external affairs working papers _vno. WPS 762
504			_aIncluye bibliografía
505			_a1. Introduction -- 2. Framework of analysis -- 3. Characterization of the memoriless subgame perfect equilibrium -- 4. The role of reserves -- 5. Debt relief and debt equity swaps -- Appendix 1: Existence and uniqueness of the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium -- Appendix 2: Proof of proposition 2 -- Appendix 3: Proof of proposition 3 -- References.
520			_aThis report compares and identifies two ways that Governments can " up-front " the adjustment effort: accumulating reserves; and engaging in an equity swap. The authors compare these methods with a constant rescheduling agreement which assumes that no reserves can be accumulated and that tax collections go to the creditors. The paper analyzes the outcome of a " memoryless " rescheduling agreement. The model exhibits two potential Laffer curves effects. In one, the lenders would want to reduce the vulnerability of the debtor to their sanctions (that is, required taxation). In the other, the debtor would actually prefer less growth than more. The role of reserves is studied and it is determined that their use can improve a country ' s welfare, over the case of the rescheduling agreement. The country must, however, be able to commit itself to a tax rate before negotiations start. Otherwise, reserves are useless. Debt-equity swaps are also studied. The outcome - always Pareto - dominates the outcome of the rescheduling equilibrium. Banks always gain a fraction of the country ' s capital above the share of output that they gain in the rescheduling equilibrium. Thus, banks are relatively less " impatient " than the country to reach a debt-relief agreement.
650			_aDEUDA PUBLICA
650			_aREBAJA DE LA DEUDA
650			_aCONVERSIONES DE LA DEUDA
700			_aVerdier, Thierry
710			_aBanco Mundial
942			_cDOCU _jF 336.3435 C 20538
999			_c16681 _d16681