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008			100212s2000 dcu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aarcduce
082			_aF 332.1
090			_c16727 _d16727
100			_aLaeven, Luc
245			_aBanking risks around the World : _bthe implicit safety net subsidy approach _c/ Luc Laeven
260			_bWorld Bank _aWashington, D.C. _c2000
300			_a34 p.
490			_aPolicy research working paper _vno. 2473
504			_aIncluye bibliografía
520			_aThe author calculates gross safety net subsidies for a large sample of banks in 12 countries, to assess the relationship between the risk-taking behavior of banks, and certain ban characteristics. He finds that gross safety net subsidies are higher for banks that have concentrated ownership, that are affiliated with a business group, that are small, or that have high credit growth, and for banks in countries with low GDP per capita, high inflation, or poor quality, and enforcement of the legal system. These findings suggest that the moral hazard behavior of a bank depends on its institutional environment, and its corporate governance structure. The author also presents a matrix that shows estimates of safety net subsidies for a range of given combinations of equity volatilities, and equity-to-deposit ratios. These figures could be used as input to an early warning system, for both individual, and systemic banking problems.
650			_aBANCOS
650			_aRIESGO BANCARIO
650			_aSEGURO DE DEPOSITOS
710			_aBanco Mundial
942			_cDOCU _jF 332.1 L 20439
999			_c16698 _d16698