000			03338nam a2200349 a 4500
003			arcduce
005			20120731113422.0
008			100701s2000 dcu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aarcduce
082			_a363.610985
090			_c17285 _d17285
100			_aAlcázar, Lorena
245			_aInstitutions, politics, and contracts : _bthe attempt to privatize the water and sanitation utility of Lima, Peru _c/ Lorena Alcázar, Lixin Colin Xu, Ana María Zuluaga
260			_bWorld Bank _aWashington, D.C. _c2000
300			_a56 p. : _bil.
490			_aPolicy research working paper _vno. 2478
504			_aIncluye bibliografía
520			_aThe main reason Lima failed to implement a concession was geographical: the scarcity of water sources meant high marginal costs, partly for pumping water from deep wells and building adequate storage for dry periods. High extraction costs were compounded by years of neglect; much of the system needed to be replaced. Attracting private investors meant setting prices high enough to recover these high costs and provide a reasonable return on capital. But the government had subsidized costs for years, so a concession would have required a sharp and sudden price increase to cover marginal costs. Moreover, any forward-looking investor would want to slow the pace of future investment by curbing demand through more effective (meter-based) bill collection. And cross-subsidies, which reduce the incentive to conserve water, would also have to be reduced. The ultimate cause of the concession ' s failure was geographical but the proximate cause was political. Privatizing a utility is politically tricky if it involves higher prices and the controversial ceding of monopoly powers to private parties, especially foreigners. Private participation in water is further hampered by the social importance of water and by the lack of international experience and the technical difficulties in designing privatization reform in the sector. At the same time, water offers fewer benefits than other utlities--few revenues to reward supporters or compensate losers-- and the price increases likely in Peru would especially hurt the urban poor, who were important to the president ' s support base. After a favorable start, the political equation shifted against privatization. The concession ' s failure was costly, in access goals not fully met, in adverse effects on health, and in the failure to curb consumption through metering--and hence in continued depletion of the aquifer and its increasing contamination by ocean salt. Peru ' s institutional weaknesses, especially its lack of an autonomous judiciary, might have limited how much could have been achieved. But considering the net gains from private operation in the much weaker nstitutional settings in Africa, Lima would probably have been better off with a concession.
650			_aAGUA POTABLE
650			_aSERVICIOS DE SANEAMIENTO
650			_aPRIVATIZACION
650			_aCONCESION ADMINISTRATIVA
650			_aPERU
653			_aSERVICIOS DE LIMPIEZA
653			_aSISTEMA DE AGUAS SERVIDAS
653			_aCONCESION DE SERVICIOS
653			_aLICENCIA ADMINISTRATIVA
700			_aXu, Lixin Colin
700			_aZuluaga, Ana Maria
710			_aBanco Mundial
942			_cLIBR _j363.610985 A 47722
999			_c17253 _d17253