000			01757nam a2200253 a 4500
082			_aH 1890 n. 3, 1974
090			_c20317 _d20317
100			_aKrueger, Anne O
245			_aThe political economy of the Rent-Seeking Society
260			_bAmerican Economic Association
260			_aNashville
260			_cJune 1974
300			_app. 291-303 _bil.
490			_aAmerican Economic Review _vn. 3 _x00028282
504			_aIncluye bibliografía
520			_aIn many market-oriented economies, government restrictions upon economic activity are pervasive facts of life. These restrictions give rise to rents of a variety of forms, and people often compete for the rents. Sometimes, such competition is perfectly legal. In other instances, rent seeking takes other forms, such as bribery, corruption, smuggling, and black markets. It is the purpose of this paper to show some of the ways in which rent seeking is competitive, and to develop a simple model of competitive rent seeking for the important case when rents originate from quantitative restrictions upon international trade. A preliminary section of the paper is concerned with the competitive nature of rent seeking and the quantitative importance of rents for two countries, India and Turkey. In the second section, a formal model of rent seeking under quantitative restrictions on trade is developed and the propositions indicated above are established. A final section outlines some other forms of rent seeking and suggests some implications of the analysis.
650			_aCOMERCIO INTERNACIONAL
650			_aMERCADO INTERNACIONAL
650			_aACTIVIDAD ECONOMICA
650			_aCOMPETITIVIDAD
650			_aMERCADO MUNDIAL
653			_a
942			_cANAR _jH 1890 n. 3, 1974
999			_c20268 _d20268