000 01148nam a2200253 a 4500
082 _aH 26710 n. 1, 1983
090 _c20733
_d20733
100 _aD'Aspremont, Claude
100 _aJacquemin, Alexis
100 _aGabszewicz, Jean Jaskold
100 _aWeymark, John A
245 _aOn the stability of collusive price leadership
260 _bCanadian Economics Association
260 _aToronto
260 _cFebruary 1983
300 _app. 17-25
_bil.
490 _aThe Canadian Journal of Economics
_vn. 1
_x00084085
504 _aIncluye bibliografía
520 _aThe gains from cartel formation and the stability of a dominant cartel are investigated for the price-leadership model. We show that there is a general interest in the establishment of a cartel with the competitive fringe reaping a disproportionate share of the benefits. In contrast to results involving a continuum of firms, with a finite number of firms (each with the same cost curve) there is always a stable dominant cartel.
650 _aASOCIACION DE PRODUCTORES
650 _aCARTELES
650 _aPRECIOS FIJOS
942 _cANAR
_jH 26710 n. 1, 1983
999 _c20677
_d20677