000 02198nam a22002777a 4500
003 arcduce
005 20190416063335.0
007 ta
008 160608s2008 gw_||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020 _a9783865583758
040 _aarcduce
_carcduce
082 0 _221
_a332.112
100 1 _96035
_aWeber, Anke
245 1 0 _aCommunication, decision-making and the optimal degree of transparency of monetary policy committees /
_cAnke Weber.
260 _aFrankfurt am Main :
_bDeutsche Bundesbank,
_c2008
300 _a57 p.
490 1 _aDiscussion paper. Series 1: Economic studies ;
_vno. 02/2008
504 _aBibliografía: p. 40-42.
520 3 _aThis paper develops a theoretical model of dynamic decision-making of a monetary policy committee with heterogeneous members. It investigates the optimal transparency, and the optimal way of transmitting information of committees, by analysing the effects different communication strategies have on financial markets. It is shown that the communication strategy of the central bank committee has a significant effect on the predictability of monetary policy decisions when there is asymmetric information between the committee and market agents. Transparency about the diversity of views of the committee surrounding the economic outlook makes future monetary policy more predictable. However, communicating the diversity of views regarding monetary policy decisions may lead to less predictability of monetary policy in the short term. In addition, it is shown that communication in the form of voting records has the greatest effect on market participants' near term policy expectations. These results support findings of the empirical literature and have strong implications for the optimal communication strategies of committees including the question whether individual voting records should be published.
650 4 _96952
_aAUTORIDAD MONETARIA
650 4 _aPOLITICA MONETARIA
_9378
830 0 _94690
_aDiscussion paper (Deutsche Bundesbank).
_pSeries 1: economic studies ;
_vno. 02/2008
856 4 _uhttps://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/19714/1/200802dkp.pdf
942 _2ddc
_cLIBR
_j332.112 W 53713
945 _aBEA
_c2016-06-08
999 _c25386
_d25386