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_c25684 _d25684 |
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| 003 | arcduce | ||
| 005 | 20161107122921.0 | ||
| 007 | ta | ||
| 008 | 150326s2015 ag_||||| |||| 00| 0 spa d | ||
| 040 |
_aarcduce _carcduce |
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| 100 | 1 |
_96142 _aStreb, Jorge M. _q(Jorge Miguel), _d1965- |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aOptimal relevance in imperfect information games / _cJorge M. Streb. |
| 260 |
_aBuenos Aires : _bUniversidad del CEMA, _c2015 |
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| 300 | _a22 p. | ||
| 490 | 1 |
_aSerie documentos de trabajo ; _vno. 570 _x1668-4575 |
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| 504 | _aBibliografía: p. 18-20. | ||
| 520 | 3 | _aTo help incorporate natural language into economic theory, this paper does two things. First, the paper extends to imperfect information games an equilibrium concept developed for incomplete information games, so natural language can be formalized as a vehicle to convey information about actions as well as types. This equilibrium concept is specific to language games, because information is conveyed by the sender through the message’s literal meaning. Second, the paper proposes an equilibrium refinement which selects the sender’s most preferred equilibrium. The refinement captures the notion that the speaker seeks to improve its status quo, aiming at optimal relevance. Explicit coordination through verbal communication parallels the idea of implicit coordination through focal points. | |
| 650 | 4 |
_98061 _aSEMANTICA ECONOMICA |
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| 830 | 0 |
_94462 _aSerie documentos de trabajo (Universidad del CEMA) ; _vn. 570 |
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| 856 | 4 | _uhttp://www.ucema.edu.ar/publicaciones/download/documentos/570.pdf | |
| 942 |
_2ddc _cINFT _j88757 n. 570, 2015 |
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| 945 |
_aBEA _c2016-11-07 |
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