000			01870nam a2200265 4500
999			_c27987 _d27987
005			20200824233308.0
007			cr || ||||||||
008			190807s2007 sp_|||||o|||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aarcduce _carcduce
100	1		_913916 _aFlores, Juan-Huitzi
245	1	0	_aInformation asymmetries and financial intermediation during the Baring crisis : 1880-1890 / _cJuan-Huitzi Flores. _h[recurso electrónico]
260			_aMadrid : _bUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Historia Económica e Instituciones, _c2007
300			_a1 recurso en línea (43 p.)
490	0		_aWorking papers in economic history ; _vWP 07-16
504			_aIncluye referencias bibliográficas.
520	3		_aThis paper analyses the information structure of European investors on the eve of the Baring crisis in 1890. We argue that financial intermediaries were in a privileged position by having the monopoly of information. This situation led to conflicting interests because business and proper investors’ advice were not always compatible, as they are not even today. Even though spreads in secondary market prices between Argentina’s long-term sovereign bonds and U.K. consols remained stable throughout the 1880s, primary market variables such as underwriting fees or total amounts of “money left on the table” in Argentina’s Initial Public Offerings reflect the deteriorating macroeconomic situation of the country. In fact, this paper suggests that lessons from the Baring crisis can be transferred to contemporaneous crises.
650		4	_aCRISIS FINANCIERA _y1880-1890 _9281
650		4	_aBANCOS DE INVERSION _91128
650		4	_96036 _aINFORMACION ASIMETRICA
650		4	_9513 _aHISTORIA ECONOMICA _y1880-1890
651		4	_952 _aARGENTINA
856	4		_uhttps://e-archivo.uc3m.es/handle/10016/1066?show=full
942			_2ddc _cLIE
945			_aBEA _c2019-08-07