A learning theory of referrals / Damien S. Eldridge.
Tipo de material:![Texto](/opac-tmpl/lib/famfamfam/BK.png)
- 1921377266
- 21 362.10994
Tipo de ítem | Biblioteca actual | Signatura topográfica | Estado | Fecha de vencimiento | Código de barras | |
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Biblioteca Manuel Belgrano | F 362.10994 E 21065 (Navegar estantería(Abre debajo)) | Disponible | 21065 F |
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Bibliografía: p. 25-27.
Many service industries, including the medical and legal professions in some countries, display a gated structure. Rather than approaching a final producer directly, a consumer will first seek a referral from an intermediary. Such an industry structure might help to alleviate adverse selection problems between parties that interact infrequently. Intermediaries aggregate many short-run transactions between various consumers and a particular producer. As such, they might be able to learn a producers level of proficiency more rapidly than an individual consumer. However, the presence of a positive information externality means that too few consumers will seek a referral. As such, some form of regulation to encourage consumers to seek a referral might be warranted.
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